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CHARLES P. STONE2
ABSTRACT: Human alienation from nature is evidenced by minimal under-
standing of interrelationships in the wild and an emphasis on individual wild
animals. Different viewpoints (utilitarian, biocentric, and theocentric) about the
natural world and the place of humans in it color ideas about management of
natural areas and the species therein. Decisions about nature should consider a
complex of human values including the economic, aesthetic, spiritual, ecolog-
ical, and humane, along with a preservation ethic for the future. Control of in-
troduced, or alien, animals in Hawai'i, where endangerment and extinction
rates of native species are among the highest in the world, and where alien
species cause severe degradation and disappearance of near-natural commun-
ities, has recently become controversial as a result of confrontational activities
by animal rights activists. However, people who "speak for" animals in the
world involve a wide variety of groups, including natural resource managers,
hunters and fishers, scientists, agriculturists, conservationists, and humane and
animal rights groups. An ethical system for wild animals must make good-faith
efforts to protect all human values. A good-faith approach to conflict presumes
that most groups have codes of right and wrong (ethics), even though some may
not be as completely developed as others. We need to "outgrow" narrow views
of nature by better understanding human relationships to it through meaningful
participation (hunting, management, scientific study, obser"ation, etc.). Actions
and nonactions must be governed by a holistic and flexible ethic practically
applied to different conflict situations.
considerations in the process of making deci-
sions about natural systems and their com-
ponents. However, we still suffer slow prog-
ress in search of a widely accepted
"conservation ethic." Such an ethic should
be, as Leopold recognized, an extension of
sociai ethics, neither overriding nor replacing
them (Callicott 1987).
In Hawai'i, although about 15% of the
land is legally "protected" from development
(Holt 1989), species loss continues at a stag-
gering rate, and funding for management and
research is terribly inadequate to the task at
hand. Despite heroic efforts to educate,
manage, learn, and raise funding by a num-
ber of individuals and groups in Hawai'i,
much of the public remains ignorant of, or
resistant to, a conservation etfiietllat ·would
truly consider preservation of biological di-
versity in decisions about economic growth,
job opportunities, or a perceived increased
standard of living.
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ALDO LEOPOLD, THE FOUNDER of wildlife
management in the United States, suggested
that "A thing is right when it tends to pre-
serve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise" (Leopold 1962 [1949] : 224-
225). Leopold's land ethic did not preclude
use of the land for human purposes, but was
concerned more with an attitude that would
affirm the importance of allowing nature to
exist (Moline 1986, Callicott 1990), for pres-
ent and future human well-being as well as
for its own sake. He was also concerned with
changing the status of humans from "con-
queror" to "member" of the land community
(Gawlick 1992). We need to integrate many
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The Extinction Crisis
More native species have been eliminated
from Hawai'i than anywhere else in the
United States: an estimated 60o/~ of the flora
is extinct or threatened with extinction; 50%
of the 140 species of native birds known his-
torically or from the fossil record are believed
extinct, and an additional 30 species, 41% of
all listed birds in the United States, are en-
dangered. Some 75% of the nation's histor-
ically documented plant and bird extinctions
have occurred in the Islands. An estimated
90% of dry forest, 61% of moist forest, and
42% of wet forest has been lost (Hawaii State
Department of Land and Natural Resources,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and The Na-
ture Conservancy of Hawaii 1991), with
much of what remains degraded through
species loss, alien species invasions, and for-
est fragmentation. Small populations and
single-island or even single-area endemism
make many native species vulnerable to cat-
astrophic events, stochastic processes, and
the deteriorating effects of human-produced
changes (Figure 1), particularly since these
changes occur at rates that are far too rapid
for biological adjustments.
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For island ecosystems, alien species are an
extremely important component of the prob-
lem of deterioration (Atkinson 1989, Dia-
mond 1989). The flood of alien species in
Hawai'i has accelerated native species loss
and increasingly homogenized the land-
scape, so that much of it now is dominated
by species spread by humans to other tropical
and subtropical areas around the world.
Feral pigs, goats, cattle, and sheep have de-
graded, fragmented, and eliminated large
areas from sea level to timberline (Cuddihy
and Stone 1990). Rats and mongooses; in-
troduced insects, mollusks, and diseases; and
some 86 species of invasive alien plants have
caused ecosystem changes that are less no-
ticeable than those caused by ungulates, but
are perhaps more pervasive. In Hawai'i,
conservationists are very aware of what is
native and what is alien; children and adults
are actively taught that invasive aliens are
less valuable than natives and are in conflict
with the preservation of native species and
communities (Stone 1992a). Yet, natural area
managers in Hawai'i are involved in a serious
controversy with animal rights interests over
the ethics of controlling mammals that elim-
inate native plants and animals, degrading
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FIGURE 1. Effects of different life history, environmental, and threat factors on single populations (modified from
Captive Breeding Specialist Group [International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources] 1992).
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clition in Genesis) by humans for human
purposes, and for its intrinsic value as a cre-
ation of God (Callicott 1986). Humans are
considered first among all creation in im-
portance, because God has made us most in
his image (with free will, self-spending love,
self-awareness, an ability to be spiritual and
esthetic, etc.). But other creatures are "com-
panions" united with us in our existence
(Himes and Himes 1991) and in covenant
with the Creator. Humans, as God's care-
takers, must treat nature as God treats us-
intentionally giving it value by our concern
and care, despite lack of apparent meaningful
or conscious reciprocity on the part of na-
ture. Weare called to preserve nature as part
of our existence and because it is God's lov-
ing creation (Thomas 1983). We relate to
nature by manipulating it within limits and
by appreciating (including understanding and
valuing) it (Macquarrie 1977). As with the
other worldviews, the theocentric approach
unfortunately has often considered humans
separate from nature, at least until recently;
perceived human needs have not usually been
integrated with concern for nature.
and destroying the biological communities
they compose.
Worldviews
One's viewpoint toward the natural world
colors the value one places upon individual
nonhuman lives, species preservation, and
biological community protection. Most peo-
ple in Western societies have an anthropo-
centric, utilitarian, or instrumental orienta-
tion toward nature (Weston 1985, Katz
1987). Even natural areas are "set aside"; we
can choose to do this for our own purposes
or not to do this (McNeely and Miller 1984).
Because we think we stand outside nature, we
can also choose to save or destroy a species;
it depends upon how much humans value the
species in relation to other values. It is
usually considered more important to pre-
serve "sentient" birds and mammals than
lower vertebrates or invertebrates, as has
certainly been the case in implementing the
U.S. Endangered Species Act. In the utili-
tarian view, humans are sometimes con-
sidered part of nature, but only in the sense
that all technology, including cities, is "hu-
man habitat." Alienation
A second viewpoint is that nature has val-
ues that are intrinsic, having nothing to do It has been said that the stripping of
with human use. This biocentric view of na- earthly resources really results from the
ture suggests that survival of communities stripping of meaning from everything that is
depends upon all components, even those of not technological (Evernden 1985). Some be-
no economic consequence and those that lieve that we are losing the capacity to really
most people don't know about (Taylor 1986). participate in life. In one sense, we humans
The biocentric view sometimes attributes exist in environments in which we did not
"rights" to plants and animals in an attempt evolve; we are ecologically homeless. In an-
to sanctify and protect individual nonhuman other sense, we direct our own evolution.
life. At the extreme, the rights of an animal Berry (1988: 90) stated that the human com-
are considered equivalent to those of hu- munity has become "alienated from the
mans. Like the utilitarian view, biocentrism larger dynamics of the planet and thereby has
does not really preclude the idea that humans lost its own meaning."
are outside nature; but to biocentrists more Leopold (1962 [1949]: 129) said long ago
things are considered off-limits to inter- that we need to begin "thinking like a
ference from humans. An antimanagement mountain." In today's jargon, we need to
or "preservation without interference" atti- find a new story to inhabit with respect to
-tude-iseftenchar-acteristic.--- -- --nature---(E'Iernden 1985)=a_ suitable_nLyth
The western theocentric view of nature that relates humans to a larger scheme of
suggests that nature in its diversity and won- things that will enable humans and sur-
der glorifies God. Nature is to be cared for by roundings to survive the onslaught of in-
humans (Yahwist tradition in the biblical creased human populations, technology, and
book Genesis) or managed well (priestly tra- aspirations. I would like to examine just a
;Ug •
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small part of the problem of our alienation
from nature-the way that humans relate to
animals in the wild.
Individual Animals Versus Groups
A number of cultural and psychological
variables in America lead to our alienation
from nature and to a rather simplistic ap-
proach to conservation of animals. Most
people place more emphasis on obvious hu-
man use of animals or the welfare of indi-
vidual animals than on populations, species,
or the communities in which animals live.
Some possible reasons for this are as follows:
1. Americans tend to emphasize individual
human freedoms, rights, and self-esteem
rather than values that transcend their own
experiences (Clement 1986). Legal and tech-
nological approaches to everything from
birth to death (and including sex) have re-
sulted in objectification, rationalization, and
manipulation of most human processes, with
consequent loss of connections and spiritual
values (Little 1992). People assert more con-
trol over their lives and deaths than ever be-
fore. Individual humans are encouraged to
"be all that you can be." Individual animals
are often treated like individual humans, and
groups of animals are thought of in terms of
"minimum viable populations."
2. People have psychological preferences
for individualizable animals (Clement 1986).
These include animals that are like us,
"cute," and especially young or helpless ani-
mals. So-called heroic species such as eagles,
tigers, and koalas, which tend to be perceived
as individuals in zoos or elsewhere or that
have been domesticated by humans (dogs,
cats, elephants, etc.), are preferred. Psycho-
logical dislikes for invertebrates, reptiles, and
some other groups, as with our preferences,
may be colored by cultural factors (the snake
in the Garden of Eden, the big bad wolf,
etc.). The roles of animals in ecological set-
tings and their connections with other plants
and- animals are ef little impertanee-psyche-
logically.
3. Education is viewed as training for jobs
rather than education in the broad sense
(Clement 1986). If something doesn't seem
useful, it is not taught or not learned. Yet
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public education, according to many, is
"failing to provide the essential knowledge
needed for rational understanding of the
problems we face as individuals and as a na-
tion" (Bowers 1992: 101). Esthetic and spiri-
tual values are underemphasized. A sense of
giftedness and mystery has given way to the
desire to master human life. Complex think-
ing and problem-solving are not stressed suf-
ficiently in the educational process to allow
most people to grasp ecological relationships
or complex problems in conservation biol-
ogy. Wilderness is an unknown to be feared
and/or conquered. It doesn't fit meaningfully
into a philosophical or experiential base, for
many.
4. People have a sense of helplessness
about larger and more complex systems and
issues such as the military complex, govern-
ment, economics, and political processes
(Clement 1986). The helplessness produces
groups of spectators, victims, critics, and
people waiting for assistance with the prob-
lems of life.
5. The sense of human community is being
lost as a result of urbanization, job mobility,
family breakdowns, media coverage, tech-
nology, and the commoditization of life
(Clement 1986). With less sense of human
community, there is less understanding of
natural communities and the functions of
components therein. Important distinctions
between natural and heavily modified sys-
tems, native and nonnative species, and nat-
ural and artificial biodiversity are dependent
upon community values of place, continuity,
process, and history. If these are minimized
in human communities, it is hard to value
natural communities.
6. Something becomes important only
when it directly and strongly impinges on
stimulus-worn and resistant human sensory
reception systems. Most ecological values do
not have this capability, but individual ani-
mals for which we have sympathy often do.
The plight of an individual human usually
arouses--more- sympathy-than- that of-larg~
numbers of humans in danger; it is the same
with wild animals.
7. Something becomes important when it
is truly unique to the experience or so rare
that danger is perceived. The claim that
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something is unique is true but common.
When the danger of extinction has been no-
ticed and/or when a species has been reduced
to a few individuals, a high priority may be
placed upon "doing something." On the
other hand, many commodities qualify and
another will soon come along.
Ethics ofManaging Animals
Ethics has been defined as a system or
code of morals (right and wrong) of a partic-
ular person, religion, group, or profession. A
person who is ethical conforms with the code.
Any group that purports to speak ethically
for animals can do so through force of law
(de jure) or through defining just what group
is represented. Different groups can speak for
animals in different ways, ranging from those
charged by law to protect and manage them
and the biological communities they inhabit,
to those who do not wish to see individual
animals mistreated or killed. Good ethical
systems will attempt to prioritize and recon-
cile values, while realizing that no general
ethical system will apply to all particular sit-
uations. Values are human constructs that
sometimes drive protection and management
schemes in different and conflicting direc-
tions.
An ethical system for managing wild ani-
mals must acknowledge several levels, begin-
ning with concern for biotic communities.
Although the choice of whether to value bio-
tic communities more than individual species
varies with the situation, community preser-
vation, protection, and management are pref-
erable to individual species management in
noncrisis situations for a number of reasons
(Table 1). Obviously, both species and com-
munity approaches are often needed. But a
reasonable initial ethic for wild animals
would consider long-term preservation of
communities.
A second ethical level of consideration for
wild animals is expressed in the Safe Mini-
mum-Standard- of&mservatil'm-tSMS);-irre---
placeable resources such as species should be
saved unless human social costs are "un-
acceptably large" (Norton 1986b). The as-
sumption is that every species is valuable to
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TABLE 1
REASONS FOR EMPHASIZING COMMUNITY PRESERVATION,
PROTECTION, AND MANAGEMENT*
1. Lack of knowledge means usually we don't know
enough about individual species to preserve them.
Species most likely to fulfill needs in undisturbed
communities.
2. Communities and species have instrumental
(utilitarian) if not intrinsic value. Communities
preserve both. Philosophical debate need not affect
managerial choices.
3. Preservation of communities has positive side effects
for all species within them. System of preserved areas
may prevent population declines leading to crisis.
Megaspecies foster public support and preserve many
species in situ in the process.
4. Ecosystem approach focuses on long-range problem.
HigWy managed ex situ situations are expensive,
short-range, and likely not to solve problem..
5. Species are really products of and dependent upon
communities. Without communities, species are more
specimens than species.
6. Ecosystem preservation avoids phylogenetic-scale
triage problems.
Adapted from Norton (1986a).
• Different strategies are necessary in different situations.
In a crisis situation, the individual species strategy is appro-
priate. However, ecosystem protection is preferable in noncrisis
situations.
humans, although not necessarily equally so.
If social costs override preservation, "the
burden of proof always rests on those who
would degrade a resource or destroy a spe-
cies" (Norton 1991: 153). Every extinction of
species or community is really a kind of su-
perkilling, destroying birth as well as death.
Superkilling should havesuperjustification
(Rolston 1991). There are a number of utili-
tarian reasons for saving species (Table 2).
A third level of ethical concern is the spe-
cies population. Populations are necessary to
preserve genetic diversity of species; individ-
ual populations may, in fact, become species.
Populations in different areas are important
in safeguarding against stochastic processes
leading to extinction of single small popula-
tions of a species-a common occurrence in
many-paFts-ef th@-world,induding-Hawai'i.
Preservation of gene pools unique to popula-
tions also has a high priority, especially
where few small populations exist. We ob-
viously cannot preserve individuals without
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TABLE 2
UTILITARIAN REASONS FOR SPECIES CONSERVATION
I. Every species saved provides opportunity for new
species to emerge and serve humans directly or
indirectly by supporting other species.
2. Every species lost creates further loss through
interdependency, extinction cascades, and lost
opportunity for new species.
3. Each extinction has a small probability of leading to
ecological catastrophe, eventual loss of human utility,
and eventual human extinction.
4. The most extinction-prone species are those likely to
be most useful to humans (high trophic levels, large,
rare, specialized, mutualistic, from high-diversity
systems).
5. Humans derive the most values-economic,
commercial, aesthetic-from areas of great total
diversity. Complex systems have greatest regenerative
value because they share resources necessary to
regenerate abused land most efficiently.
Adapted from Norton (1986b).
an ethic to preserve populations and gene
pools.
A fourth level of ethical consideration for
animals in the wild is the individual. Most of
the existing ethical standards for individual
animals apply to laboratory animal research
and are mediated by institutional Animal
Care and Use Committees (ACUCs). But in-
dividual animals are also studied, handled,
and killed in research, management, or con-
trol programs in the wild. Recently, the Sci-
entists' Center for Animal Welfare (1988)
summarized research guidelines that address
some of the problems of working with ani-
mals under field conditions. These guidelines
are taken from guidelines for humane re-
search drawn up by professional vertebrate
societies for different taxonomic groups
(birds, mammals, amphibians and reptiles,
and fish) and deal directly with problems of
field workers. They recognize the difficulty of
applying laboratory standards in field situa-
tions, taxonomic and physiological variables,
the importance of judgments of experienced
field-investigators,ano-tne need "for -researcn
on humane research techniques and pain.
Also considered are difficulties in treating
different taxa with the same standards of hu-
maneness, conflicts that emerge in protecting
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some animals or their habitats from other
animals, and the need to consider the welfare
of all animals in a population. The authors of
the report stated (1988: 17) that "On the
whole, field investigators have a more global
view of animal welfare" [than laboratory
workers].
Animal Rights and Wrongs
Do animals have rights to life, liberty,
and even the pursuit of happiness? Does a
tree have a right not to be made into furni-
ture? Do humans have the moral obligation
to avoid killing, stressing, boring, or making
uncomfortable other forms of life? Are the
human obligations to all life forms equal?
Are distinctions in this regard drawn on the
principle of similarity to humanness? Should
grizzly bears respect human-declared rights
to human life?
I believe that the argument for inalienable
or a priori animal "rights" breaks down
somewhere in this line of questioning. Rights
are attributable to beings with interests and
values that have desires and goals. Such
"moral agents" need to be mutually able to
respect each other's values. The human re-
sponsibility for nonhumans is not generally
based on rights in the human sense, but on
value complexes. For example, some species
such as migratory birds and endangered spe-
cies are protected by law because of their val-
ue to humans. Yet when protection conflicts
with other needs or desires of humans, hunt-
ing season for waterfowl opens or com-
promises are sought. A grizzly bear protected
by the Endangered Species Act is destroyed
if it kills people. Protection of a species may
also conflict with other values such as un-
modified ecological succession, nutrient cy-
cles, and natural selection; the needs of other
organisms in the same community with the
protected species; and the elimination of in-
dividual plants and animals of other species.
A Hawaiian example of conflicting values
is flie'effecf oCiiifroQucedor -allen fernlpigs
in natural areas, which compromises other
values related to native Hawaiian species
(Stone 1985, Stone and Anderson 1988).
Feral pigs cannot be tolerated where natural
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area management is the goal, because they
are not natural (i.e., part of an integrated
community of plants and animals that have
evolved together). Most authorities in Ha-
wai'i agree that conservation biologists
"should be as proficient at eradicating exotic
species as they are at saving endangered spe-
cies" (Temple 1990: 113), especially where
aliens are invasive and capable of degrading
and destroying entire communities of native
species.
In an attempt to speak for the welfare of
nonhuman animals, species, or even com-
munities, we make matters worse if we do not
try to understand the connections and in-
tegrity of biotic communities. We must real-
ize that we speak as humans; this is true no
matter how much we know. Nevertheless, we
must attempt to consider a complex of val-
ues, including those for the future, before
decisions in particular situations. This is not
to deny intrinsic value, worth, or even "in-
terests" of individual animals, species, or
communities-only to say that many values
must be considered together. Inalienable
"rights" are few and far between, even for
individual humans. In fact, the whole lan-
guage of "rights," although useful in some
conditions, has disadvantages because it
tends to emphasize the absolute, the cosmo-
politan, and the individual (Cobb 1989). The
rights argument is primarily emotional and
biased toward higher life forms (Causey
1989). Both humans and other animals live in
community; humans must consider the wel-
fare of other humans and all other organisms
before acting in a narrow or emotional con-
text to protect rights of specific individuals.
In Hawai'i, equal value cannot be given to
alien and native animals where one is dis-
ruptive of, and one is an intrinsic component
of, the natural communities that agencies and
organizations are charged to protect. Focus-
ing only on current and simplistic individual
animal-or human- rights- perpetuates-the-idea-
that we humans can remain outside nature,
satisfying our own current needs (including
sympathy), without really trying to under-
stand what effects we are having by our ac-
tions and inactions. A simplistic ethic that
gives supreme value to individual lives of
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alien animals a priori does not really en-
compass problems inherent in the uses that
humans make of animals, the different values
given to different taxa, and numerous con-
flicts that we cause among values apparent
all around us. Thus, such an ethic is both
morally and biologically immature. The strict
animal rights approach ignores ecological re-
ality, brooks no compromise, is not in har-
mony with what occurs in nature, and does
not consider well the present and future
needs of people and natural communities.
And humans remain alienated from nature
and its workings through acceptance of the
ethic, instead of working to become more in
touch and in tune.
Hunting and Fishing
Hunting and fishing can have much to of-
fer in the sense of truly participating in and
understanding nature (Causey 1989). Ethical
hunting and fishing require that humans un-
derstand the habits and connections of the
quarry in an ecological setting. The prepara-
tion and the "chase" can be as of old, part of
a cultural and species heritage once vital to
humans (Ortega y Gasset 1985 [1942]). The
kill can be a product of the hunting or fishing
expedition, rather than a specific goal. The
goal should be the spiritual and cultural ex-
perience achieved. The need for meat usually
need not be the driving force for hunting or
fishing. The ethical hunter or fisher has truly
ambiguous feelings at the kill-a mixed re-
spect for the quarry, sorrow at death, in-
creased self-esteem at the end of the chase,
and regret that the experience is done (Ortega
y Gasset 1985 [1942]). The animal is con-
sidered a real part of the world in which the
hunter lives, rather than a disconnected en-
tity (Little 1992). The recent popular Amer-
ican films A River Runs Through It and The
Last of the Mohicans (opening scene) mani-
fest--anethicthat-stiU--has value__for. many
people today.
Causey (1989) considered hunting and
fishing ethical because they contribute to hu-
man understanding of life and death in na-
ture. Vitali (1990) believed they are ethical
because they exercise and perpetuate natural
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(fundamental?) human skills-to many, a
sufficient argument that offsets the humane
killing of individual animals. Hunters and
fishers also contribute considerable revenue
to the preservation of wild areas, a plus for
other users and the plants and animals
therein. Hunting in subsistence native human
cultures has spiritual validity and is sup-
ported by most people on that basis; thus,
failing to allow spiritual and cultural motives
for humans other than those in subsistence
cultures seems inconsistent (Causey 1989).
Hunting and fishing can also be considered
ethical when they replace other mortality for
managed species, with small positive or neg-
ative effects on community balance.
Hunting and fishing at their best can pro-
duce a sense of community integrity and
connectedness of parts that is vital if humans
are really to understand, value, and perpet-
uate nature. Hunters and fishers actually
contribute to ecological processes (life and
death) upon which communities are based
(Vitali 1990). In addition, those directly par-
ticipating in nature soon realize that their ig-
norance about it will always remain. In-
creased experience deepens the sense of
respect as well, adding to the sense that
something not under human control is in-
volved. Like hunting and fishing, ecological
research and management, nature photog-
raphy and study, and other activities can
serve as ways for humans to reduce aliena-
tion from nature through respect, humility,
understanding, and active, knowledgeable
involvement that does not compromise nat-
ural processes or affect community composi-
tion.
As with other human endeavors, hunting
and fishing are not always done ethically.
According to Rolston (1988), those who kill
just for fun are obviously at least morally
immature. Causey (1989) considered game
farms "wooded shooting galleries" that can-
not be considered hunting places, and are the
moral equivalent of brothels. Avid meat or
tmphy-hunrers can- freat-ammiils-as- com::
modities, rather than lifeforms to be re-
spected and valued in context, and can also
be considered less than adequately involved
in understanding nature (Causey 1989). Such
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"hunting" and "fishing" borders on the
senseless and is difficult to defend ethically.
The proportion of hunters and fishers who
fall in these categories is for sociologists to
determine and management agencies to re-
duce, if a consistently higher moral plane is
to be achieved.
The Problem ofIndividual Deaths
From the standpoint of saving individual
nonhuman lives in Hawaiian natural areas, it
can be argued that removal of a relatively
few alien animals of a few species in no dan-
ger of extinction will save countless individ-
ual native animals of various species, many
of which are in danger of disappearing from
the face of the earth. The deaths of native
species are not necessarily "humane," as wit-
nessed by the emaciation and weak condition
attained by birds suffering from introduced
avian malaria and pox. How many and how
badly individuals of various native species die
is not often factored into the ethical equa-
tion.
Similarly, if the total number of animals
dying is a factor in considerations of overall
humaneness, which I think it should be,
fewer animals efficiently killed over a short
time span would seem to be preferrable to
much greater numbers killed by less efficient
but supposedly gentler methods. Because hu-
mans really know very little about stress,
suffering, and pain in different species of wild
animals (Stone 1992b), the argument of total
animals killed seems all the more persuasive.
The National Park Service (Stone 1992c; B.
Harry, pers. comm., October 1993) and other
agencies in Hawai'i argue that fencing to re-
move feral pigs from an area prevents in-
gress, thus minimizing numbers of pigs to be
killed. However, the animals must be re-
moved rapidly or production of new animals
soon replaces numbers of animals removed in
control programs. More research OlumfferinK
expenenced-by-anunais-dying in different
ways is definitely needed and would seem to
be well within the purview of well-funded
and deeply concerned animal rights groups, if
further suffering is to be minimized.
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Whose Ethics Should We Choose?
Which ethical concerns for wild animals
should have priority? Both the ethics of ani-
mal rights and the land ethic are appealing,
but holding both simultaneously is difficult
(Loftin 1992). It could be argued that an
ethical hierarchy logically can be established
in which the highest value is the ecosystem or
community and the lowest is the individual
animal. Individuals in the wild depend on
populations, which depend on species, which
depend on communities for their continued
survival. Unlike the laboratory situation, in-
dividual wild animals do not stand alone.
They depend on other animals and plants
and ecosystem integrity.
I think that an advanced ethical system
should consider the complexities involved as
fully as possible. It should recognize a human
duty to nonhuman objects that goes beyond
felt experience. An environmental ethic
should work toward minimal conflicts among
all values of concern. The ethic of nature
differs from that of culture. "There are no
rights in the wild, and nature is indifferent to
the welfare of particular animals" (Rolston
1991 :75). Yet, it is not ethical for humans to
kill animals any more cruelly than necessary
to protect other values at risk or to gain the
knowledge decreed vital to human use.
Neither is it ethical to allow animals in-
troduced by humans to destroy habitats of
native animals (and plants) or otherwise to
put native species at risk, unless other human
social costs are unacceptably large. "To al-
low the extinction of animal species is eco-
logically, economically, and ethically un-
sound" (Senator Tunney in Varner 1987: 63).
Where protection of ecosystems and individ-
ual animals collide, other social and legal
values and future considerations may be
stressed in making the most ethical decision.
Again, ethics are group codes; the more
knowledgeable and holistic the group ad-
dressing wild.animaLwelfare, .theJ~F~r re~l
ethical conflicts are likely to occur.
Still, the continued existence of in-
dividuals, species, and communities may not
be possible in some places, and conflicting
human ethics may remain irreconcilable.
Moral pluralism in America is a fact of life
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that cannot, and probably should not, be
theoretically unified (Norton 1991). Case-by-
case conflicts may have to be settled with this
in mind, rather than attempting illogical
compromise. After all, ethics are also self-
imposed limitations on actions (Leopold
1962 [1949]) for purposes of community-in
this case, both human and natural. More
ethical behavior by all humans in difficult
circumstances should be possible, but com-
promise in ethical values by different groups
may not. Perhaps predominance by one side
in one geographical area and by another side
in another area is the only possible solution
available when ethical standards of two
groups differ seriously.
In addition to the emotion, publicity, and
political tactics that are the common cur-
rency in decision-making, facts and dialogue
should be sought by those who have interest
in and knowledge about wild animals in par-
ticular situations. Legal and societal man-
dates have been produced by the public, and
the responsibilities of those charged with ful-
filling the mandates cannot be ignored in a
reasonable ethical approach. At some point,
advocates of conflicting ethical views must
accept good-faith efforts to solve problems
and reduce conflicts. A conservation ethic for
wild animals may eventually broaden in
scope, and opposing groups may ultimately
find more middle ground. Until then, reduced
posturing and threatening behavior seem in
order, to enhance credibility if nothing else.
As the most recent of many groups that
claim to "speak for the animals" in the wild,
animal rights advocates have a special obli-
gation to become more aware of the ethics of
others and more concerned with under-
standing the broad spectrum of values in-
volved in preserving wild animals (Ehrenfeld
1991). But hunters and fishers, scientists,
managers, recreationists, and others need to
reappraise the importance of the lives of in-
di"vidual animals. The interests of humans
and nature differ only in the short run; long-
-tennhuman mterests coinci<fe·witllln.e-Tilll-
ness of life (Norton 1988). As with egoism,
the real answer to narrow anthropocentric
value systems is to outgrow them (Weston
1992). We can do this by understanding our
relationships to the real living world through
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meaningful participation in nature. All par-
ties need to work harder to educate them-
selves and the public about what is really in-
volved in preserving wild animals in their
natural environments, now and for the fu-
ture.
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